- 1	l e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e		
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2	Hana S. Kim [SBN 313178] REUBEN RAUCHER & BLUM		
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4	Telephone: (310) 777-1990 Facsimile: (310) 777-1989		
5			
6	Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners Hill RHF Ho and Olive RHF Housing Partners, L.P.	ousing Partners, L.P.	
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9	SUPERIOR COURT OF TH	IE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
10	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES		
11			
12	HILL RHF HOUSING PARTNERS, L.P., a	Case No.: BS138416	
13	California limited partnership; OLIVE RHF HOUSING PARTNERS, L.P., a California limited	[Assigned to Hon. Amy D. Hogue, Dept. 86]	
14	partnership,	PLAINTIFFS'/PETITIONERS' REPLY IN	
15	Petitioners/Plaintiffs,	SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. SECTION	
16	VS.	664.6 AND GRANT ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS OF \$7,150.00; DECLARATION OF	
17	CITY OF LOS ANGELES; DOWNTOWN CENTER BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT	HANA S. KIM	
18	DISTRICT, a special assessment district in the City of Los Angelcs; DOWNTOWN CENTER	Date: January 31, 2018	
19	BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, a California	Time: 9:30 a.m. Place: Dept. 86	
20	nonprofit corporation,	Complaint Filed: July 18, 2012	
21	Respondents/Defendants.	Complaint Float Valy 10, 2012	
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### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

### PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The Settlement Agreement is enforceable against Defendant the City of Los Angeles ("the City") for so long as DCBID continues to exist in its current formulation, pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the Settlement Agreement. Even when read in conjunction with Paragraph 2 and 6, as the City argues, Paragraph 5 clearly entitles Plaintiffs/Petitioners Hill RHF Housing Partners, L.P. and Olive RHF Housing Partners, L.P. (collectively, "RHF") to reimbursements from the City for any assessments paid to DCBID for so long as: (1) the Plaintiffs remain the owners of the subject properties, which they are; and (2) DCBID continues in the same formulation, which it does. Paragraph 2, which provides the context from which the underlying litigation arose, does not limit the scope of the Settlement Agreement to DCBID's expired term which ended on December 31, 2017. Paragraph 6, which provides that the Settlement Agreement only applies to DCBID and no other business improvement district, also does not cut against the plain reading of Paragraph 5. As such, the Court must give effect to the plain language of Paragraph 5.

The City, throughout its opposition, concedes that DCBID has been in existence and has continued to provide the same services since 1997. Because its boundaries, services, and name are all the same, it continues in the same formulation. Faced with this reality, the City tries to equate "formulation" with "methodology," which is a false equivalency. However, even under the City's definition, the prior and renewed DCBIDs are the same. DCBID has at all times been governed by the same law that requires business improvement districts to separate and quantify special benefits from general benefits, and the City concedes that the only difference between the expired DCBID term and the renewed DCBID term is that the former calculated general benefits as zero, whereas the latter calculated general benefits as a number other than zero. Accordingly, although the numbers may differ, the formulation and methodology are the same.

Finally, the Settlement Agreement was not jointly drafted, and the Settlement Agreement does not contain a term which deems the Settlement Agreement as jointly drafted. As such, to

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the extent that any ambiguity exists, such ambiguity should be construed against the creator of that ambiguity, the City.

II.

### A PLAIN READING OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SUPPORTS FINDING IN FAVOR OF CONTINUED ENFORCEMENT.

In opposing RHF's Motion to Enter Judgment Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6, the City tellingly minimizes Paragraph 5 of the Settlement Agreement, which is the only provision that specifically addresses the duration of the Settlement Agreement by providing:

In order to resolve the matters raised and described in the Litigation, the City will undertake to make the Plaintiffs whole for those assessments made by the DCBID against the properties owned by Plaintiffs at the time of the formation of the DCBID, as described in the Petition. For so long as the Plaintiffs remain the owners of these properties, and the DCBID continues in its current formulation, the City will remit to Plaintiffs an amount sufficient to satisfy the amounts paid by Plaintiffs to the DCBID as part of assessments set forth in the Engineer's Report and the Management Plan.

(Ex. 1 to D. Stouff Decl.). A plain reading of Paragraph 5 entitles Plaintiffs to continued reimbursements from the City for so long as DCBID continues to exist in the same formulation, through its acknowledged renewals. Because the plain reading of Paragraph 5 is so straightforward, the City chooses instead to divert the Court's attention to Paragraphs 2 and 6, which do not address the duration of the Settlement Agreement, and requests that the Court disregard the language in Paragraph 5. (Opposition at Page 2, Lines 6-11). So strongly does the plain reading of Paragraph 5 favor RHF that the City even tries to interpose terms into Paragraph 5, citing Paragraph 5 as stating, "[T]he Settlement Agreement lasts 'so long as Petitioners remain the owners of these properties' during the five-year term of the 2013 DCBID." (Opposition at Page 6, Lines 24-25). However, there is no "during the five-year term of the 2013 DCBID" language in Paragraph 5, and the City's attempt to argue terms which do not exist is improper.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Based on this reading, the City is not obliged to make reimbursements forever, as the City contends. Rather, the City is obligated to pay the reimbursements for so long as DCBID continues to exist in its current formulation. This is not an indefinite or ambiguous term.

Furthermore, consideration of Paragraphs 2 and 6 – and the remaining four corners of the Settlement Agreement – does not alter the plain reading of the contractual language to limit the Settlement Agreement to DCBID's expired term, which ended on December 31, 2017. RHF should prevail.

### A. Paragraph 2 Does Not Cut Against RHF's Plain Reading Argument.

The City argues that according to the Settlement Agreement, and specifically Paragraph 2, "[t]he only assessments the City must pay are those 'set forth in an Engineer's Report and a Management District Plan' attached to the Petition in this matter, i.e., the 2012 Engineer's Report and the 2012 District Plan." (Opposition at Page 4, Lines 18-20). However, Paragraph 2, while specifically referencing the 2012 Engineer's Report and 2012 Management District Plan as part of the context of the underlying litigation, does not limit the City's reimbursement obligations to RHF's assessments set forth in the 2012 Engineer's Report and 2012 Management District Plan. Rather, Paragraph 2 simply and succinctly provides the background from which the litigation arose. By making the argument that according to Paragraph 2, the City's payments terminate with the expired DCBID term, the City is essentially interposing new terms to the Settlement Agreement, which is improper.<sup>2</sup>

Similarly, the Court should disregard the City's "maximum relief" argument, by which the City claims that the Settlement Agreement "gave [RHF] maximum relief a court could have provided: freedom from assessments relating to the 2013 DCBID [and therefore it] clearly and unambiguously applies only to the 2013 DCBID." (Opposition at Page 7, Lines 7-9). This argument is flawed because neither the law nor the Settlement Agreement requires that the relief provided by the Settlement Agreement be limited to the maximum relief that could have been granted in the underlying litigation had the parties not settled. Indeed, had RHF not settled the lawsuit, the DCBID would likely have been invalidated completely for its noncompliance with California's constitutional law governing business improvement districts. Granting RHF relief from future DCBID assessments was a small price to pay for the City.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Moreover, Paragraph 5 does *not* specify the 2012 Engineer's Report or the 2012 Management District Plan.

The City contends that, pursuant to Paragraph 6, the Settlement Agreement only concerns

"the DCBID, adopted by ordinance of the City Council on June 19, 2012." (Opposition at Page

8, Lines 18-20). However, the DCBID which was adopted by ordinance of the City Council on

June 19, 2012 is the same DCBID which was admittedly renewed by ordinance of the City

Council on June 7, 2017. (See Ex. 1 to H. Kim Decl. and Ex. G to D. Whitley Decl.). Indeed,

both ordinances refer to DCBID simply as DCBID - not this DCBID or that DCBID. The

language contained in all of the ordinances adopting DCBID for new terms, simply refers

broadly and generally to DCB1D as DCB1D supporting RHF's contention that DCB1D is not

defined by its term (which is statutorily required to be renewed) or by the specific ordinance

renewing its term. (Ex. 1 to H. Kim Decl. and Ex. A, Ex. B, Ex. D, and Ex. G to D. Whitley

Decl.). Even the City admits to the continuity of DCB1D from as early as 1997. (Opposition at

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Page 3, Line 14-15).

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Paragraph 6, which provides, "This Agreement does not address any business improvement district except the DCBID adopted by ordinance of the City Council on June 19, 2012," should be read as limiting the Settlement Agreement to DCBID, and no *other* business improvement district (e.g., the San Pedro Historic Waterfront Business Improvement District). A plain reading of Paragraph 6 does not result in an understanding that each time DCBID is renewed, it is a completely new and different entity. Thus, Paragraph 6, which limits the Settlement Agreement to DCBID and no other business improvement district, does not limit Paragraph 5 to mean that reimbursements are discontinued after December 31, 2017.

## C. Reading Paragraph 5 in the Context of the Entire Settlement Agreement Only Highlights That it Applies to Renewals.

While it is true that Paragraph 2 refers to the 2012 Engineer's Report and 2012 Management District Plan, and Paragraph 6 refers to the ordinance adopted by the City Council in 2012, the *lack* of these references in Paragraph 5 supports a finding that the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement was not intended to be tied to any specific DCB1D term, but rather DCB1D's continued existence. In other words, that specific references to the 2012 Engineer's

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Report and 2012 Management District Plan and the June 2012 Ordinance adopting DCBID's term beginning on January 1, 2013, are found in neighboring provisions but not in Paragraph 5, only supports a finding that the reimbursement arrangement continues beyond the expired DCBID term.

#### III.

### THE CITY FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DCBID IS NOT CONTINUING IN THE SAME FORMULATION.

Based on the discussion contained above, it is clear that Paragraph 5 cannot be ignored in determining the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement. As such, the issue becomes whether DCBID is continuing in its current formulation, in light of its recent renewal. The City has failed to show that the renewed DCBID is operating under a new formulation.

### The City Concedes That DCBID is "Continuing" Through its Renewal.

The City contradicts its argument that the renewed DCBID is a distinct entity from the expired DCBID by conceding that "the evidence shows that the 2018 DCBID does not 'continue' or 'renew' the 2013 DCBID, but the 1997 DCBID. The 2018 DCBID 'renews' and 'continucs' a line of DCB1Ds that started no later than 1997." (Opposition at Page 2, Lines 13-15). The City also admits, "[S]omething named the DCBID has continued providing similar services since 1997 . . . All of the DCBIDs have provided similar services (i.e., safety, cleaning, and district identity/marketing services, as well as administrative upkeep)." (Opposition at Page 3, Lines 14-23). Thus, the City acknowledges that DCBID has continued to exist and has been providing the same services since 1997. Just as a corporation or other entity is not defined by a new and specific fiscal year, DCBID should not be defined by its statutorily required renewed terms.

#### Based on the City's Concessions, DCBID is Continuing in its Existing Formulation. В.

The City acknowledges that during its various terms, DCBID, "until the most recent [renewal] had similar formulations and methodologies for assessing the cost of special benefits," and argues that the renewed DCBID is different because it bas "determined and calculated a general benefit that will not be paid by assessees." (Opposition at Page 3, Lines 23-26). In so stating, the City concedes that DCBID has been continuing in its "formulation" from at least

1997 to December 31, 2017. The critical distinction, according to the City, between the expired DCB1D and the renewed DCB1D, is the renewed DCB1D's determination and calculation of general benefits. (Opposition at Page 13, Lines 16-17).

The City's argument is flawed, however, even assuming "methodology" is the same thing as "formulation," which RHF disputes. DCBID was always required by the law to determine and calculate general benefits. See Cal. Const. Art. XIII D, § 4(a); see also Silicon Valley Taxpayers' Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority, 44 Cal.4th 431 (2008). And DCBID did determine and calculate general benefits in the 2012 Engineer's Report of the expired DCB1D term. (See Pages 9-11 of Ex. 8 of S. Raucher Decl.). The fact that the 2012 Engineer's Report quantified general benefits as zero while the 2018 Engineer's Report quantified general benefits as more than zero does not mean that DCB1D is operating under a new formulation. The formula is the same, even though the numbers change.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, even under the City's construction, DCBID continues in its same formulation.

IV.

### ANY AMBIGUITY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AGAINST THE CITY

The City cites Mitchell v. Exhibition Foods, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1033 (1986), in arguing that a contract cannot be construed against either party when it results from joint drafting by both parties. However, the Mitchell court acknowledged that the trial court had made an express finding that the specific provision in question (i.e., not the entire contract but a specific provision, the right of first refusal) was jointly drafted by the parties and the parties did not challenge this determination. Mitchell v. Exhibition Foods, 184 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1042 (1986). For this reason, the Court of Appeal did not apply "the familiar principle that ambiguities and uncertainties are to be construed against the party who created them in drafting the contract." Id.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In Section D of its opposition, the City misstates RHF's position by stating that RHF is arguing that all of DCBlD's future and past terms were the "subject matter of the Litigation between the parties," and that RHF is therefore barred from challenging the 2018 DCB1D in Case No. BS170127. The City's request for judgment in its favor in Case No. BS170127 is obviously procedurally improper. But, in any event, this lawsuit, Case No. BS138416, only dealt with the 2012 Engineer's Report's failure to comply with the law, and the scope of the release in the Settlement Agreement only applied to the subject of this case. This does not mean, however, that the City's obligations under the Settlement Agreement are limited to DCB1D's expired term.

Here, Paragraph 5 was created by the City. (K. Brooks Decl., ¶ 5). It was never changed. Thus, any ambiguities contained therein were also created by the City, and thus, should be construed against the City. It should also be noted that the Settlement Agreement does not contain any language that the instrument was jointly drafted. Implying such a provision would constitute the creation of a term which the parties did not agree to, which the Court may not do on a motion under Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6. Thus, ambiguities, if any, contained in Paragraph 5, should be construed against the City.

V.

### AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO WHAT IS REASONABLE.

The prevailing party in this proceeding is only entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs. See Code of Civ. Proc. § 1717. In its opposition, the City requests a total of \$16,406.25 for nearly 25 hours of legal services in connection with opposing this motion. In contrast, RHF requested a total of \$7,150 for approximately 15 hours of legal services in connection with making this motion, including a Reply. The contrast in attorney's fees amounts supports a finding that the City's request, should it prevail, is unreasonable. The City Attorney dedicated almost 21 hours to drafting the opposition; however, 21 hours is unreasonable in light of the fact that this motion is simple and merely requires the application of general contract interpretation rules.

It should also be noted that the contrast between the City's request for fees and RHF's request for fees is due in part to the fact that the City's attorney claimes RHF's lead attorney's billing rate of \$625 per hour. However, RHF's lead attorney's services constituted only a third of RHF's attorney's fees and costs – the remainder is attributed to an associate whose billing rate is \$305 per hour. Accordingly, in the unlikely event that the City prevails in opposing this motion, RHF requests that the Court use the associate attorney's billing rate in determining any attorney's fees and costs to the City, which would justify an award of no more than \$7,625. Alternatively, RHF requests that the Court use the rate that the City Attorney generally charges, \$550 per hour. (Decl. of D. Whitley, ¶11).

### VI.

### **CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, RHF requests that the Court enforce the DCBID Settlement Agreement against the City, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6, and award \$7,150.00 in attorney's fees and costs to RHF.

DATED: January 24, 2018

REUBEN RAUCHER & BLUM

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners

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1.

I, HANA S. K1M, declare as follows:

Council File 12-0422, is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

**DECLARATION OF HANA S. KIM** 

an associate at the firm of Reuben Raucher & Blum, attorneys of record for Petitioner/Plaintiff

Hill RHF Housing Partners, L.P. and Petitioner/Plaintiff Olive RHF Housing Partners, L.P.

I am an attorney at law, duly licensed to practice in the State of California. I am

(collectively, "RHF"). I have direct personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and if called as a witness, I could and would competently testify to those facts under oath. 2. A true and correct copy of the ordinance which adopted the Downtown Center Property and Business Improvement District's ("DCBID") term from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2017, Ordinance No. 182171, as obtained from the Office of the City Clerk,

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 24th day of January, 2018 at Los Angeles, California.

ORDINANCE NO.	182171
OKDINANCE NO.	

An ordinance establishing the Downtown Center Property and Business Improvement District (District) and levying assessments, pursuant to the Provisions of the Property and Business Improvement District Law of 1994 (Division 18, Part 7, Streets and Highways Code, State of California).

WHEREAS, the Property and Business Improvement District Law of 1994 authorizes cities to establish Property and Business Improvement Districts for the purpose of levying assessments on real property for certain purposes; and

WHEREAS, petitions were filed by property owners in the Downtown Center business community who would pay more than 50 percent of the total amount of assessments to be levied, requesting that the City Council establish the Downtown Center Business Improvement District; and

WHEREAS, the City Council, on Tuesday, April 10, 2012 adopted Ordinance No. 182107 declaring its intention to establish the Downtown Center Business Improvement District and levy assessments; and

WHEREAS, the City Clerk gave notice, in the manner specified in Government Code Section 53753, to the record owner of each parcel subject to the levy of an assessment that a public hearing would be held on Tuesday, June 12, 2012 concerning establishment of the District; and

WHEREAS, the City Council held a public hearing concerning establishment of the District shortly after 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, June 12, 2012 in the John Ferraro Council Chamber, Room 340, City Hall, 200 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California; and

WHEREAS, the City Council has heard all testimony and received all evidence concerning the establishment of the District and desires to establish the District.

### NOW THEREFORE,

### THE PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES DO ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF DISTRICT AND LEVY OF ASSESSMENTS. The City Council hereby establishes the Downtown Center Business Improvement District and levies an assessment on each property within the District for each fiscal year referred to in the Management District Plan.

Sec. 2. MAJORITY PROTEST. The City Council hereby finds that there was no

majority protest against the establishment of the District and levy of assessments.

- Sec. 3. ADOPTION OF ENGINEER'S REPORT AND MANAGEMENT DISTRICT PLAN. The City Council hereby reaffirms its adoption, approval, and confirmation of the Engineer's Report and the Management District Plan included in Council File No. 12-0422.
- Sec.4. PARCELS WITHIN THE DISTRICT. The City Council hereby reaffirms its finding that all parcels, which will have a special benefit conferred upon them and upon which an assessment is imposed, are identified in the Management District Plan.
- Sec. 5. PROPORTIONAL BENEFIT. The City Council hereby reaffirms that the assessment imposed on each parcel does not exceed the reasonable cost of the proportional benefit conferred on that parcel.
- Sec. 6. SEPARATION OF GENERAL AND SPECIAL BENEFITS. The City Council hereby reaffirms that it has separated the general benefits, if any, from the special benefits conferred on each parcel.
- Sec. 7. ASSESSMENTS SUPPORTED BY ENGINEER'S REPORT. The City Council hereby reaffirms that all assessments are supported by a detailed Engineer's Report prepared by a registered professional engineer certified by the state of California.
- Sec. 8. DISTRICT BOUNDARIES. The City Council hereby declares that the boundaries of the proposed District are as detailed in the Management District Plan. The Downtown Center BID consists of 65 blocks of the west, northwestern and central downtown area of Los Angeles; bounded by the 110 Harbor Freeway on the west, 1st Street on the north, Hill Street, Main Street and Los Angeles Street on the East and 9th Street and Olympic Boulevard on the south. All property within the approximate boundaries described above are included in the proposed District.
- Sec. 9. THE DISTRICT'S ASSESSMENT. The City Council hereby reaffirms that the District's total assessment for five (5) years is \$32,897,952, and the District's total annual assessment for the first year is estimated to be \$5,953,700.
- Sec. 10. IMPROVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES. The City Council hereby reaffirms that the District's activities and improvements are detailed in the Management District Plan and include, but are not limited to: Clean and Safe, Economic Development and Marketing, Special Projects, Reserve, Delinquency and Administration.
- Sec. 11. FUNDING OF IMPROVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES. The City Council declares that the improvements and activities to be provided in the District will be funded by the levy of assessments on properties within the District. The revenue from

the levy of assessments within the District shall not be used to provide improvements and activities outside the District or for any purpose other than the purposes specified in Ordinance No. 182107. The District will not Issue bonds.

- Sec. 12. BENEFIT TO PROPERTIES WITHIN THE DISTRICT. The City Council finds and declares that the properties within the District will be benefitted by the improvements and activities funded by the assessments to be levied.
- Sec. 13. The City Council declares that the properties within the District shall be subject to any amendments to the Property and Business Improvement District Law of 1994 (Division 18, Part 7, Streets and Highways Code, State of California).
- Sec. 14. DISTRICT OPERATIONAL PERIOD. The District's operational period shall begin on January 1, 2013 and end on December 31, 2017.
- Sec. 15. PERIOD TO REQUEST DISESTABLISHMENT. There shall be a 30-day period in each year of the District's operation during which property owners may request disestablishment of the District. The first period shall begin one year after the effective date of this ordinance and shall continue for 30 days. The next 30-day period shall begin two years after the effective date of this ordinance and continue for 30 days. For each successive year of the District's operation, the 30-day period shall begin on the anniversary of the effective date of this ordinance and continue for 30 days.
- Sec 16. SPECIAL FUND ESTABLISHMENT. The revenue from the assessment shall be collected and placed in the Special Trust Fund to be established and to be known as the Downtown Center Business Improvement District Fund (Fund). All interest and other earnings attributable to assessments, contributions and other revenue deposited in the Special Fund shall be credited to the Fund.
- Sec. 17. AMENDMENT TO ENABLING STATUTE. The properties and businesses within the District established by this Ordinance shall be subject to any amendments to the Property and Business Improvement District Law of 1994 (Division 18, Part 7, Streets and Highways Code, State of California).

Sec. 18. The City Clerk shall certify to the passage of this ordinance and have it published in accordance with Council policy, either in a daily newspaper circulated in the City of Los Angeles or by posting for ten days in three public places in the City of Los Angeles: one copy on the bulletin board located at the Main Street entrance to the Los Angeles City Hall; one copy on the bulletin board located at the Main Street entrance to the Los Angeles City Hall East; and one copy on the bulletin board located at the Temple Street entrance to the Los Angeles County Hall of Records.

I hereby certify that this ordina Angeles, at its meeting of	nce was passed by the Council of the City of Los
	JUNE LAGMAY, City Clerk
	By A Deputy
JUN 2 2 2012 Approved	
Approved	(elv)
	Mayor
Approved as to Form and Legality	

CARMEN A. TRUTANICH, City Attorney

CHRISTY NUMANO-HIURA Deputy City Attorney

Date 5-10-12

Council File No. 12-0422

### STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

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I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. 1 am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 12400 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 800, Los Angeles, California 90025.

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

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On January 24, 2018, 1 served the foregoing document described as:

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### PLAINTIFFS'/PETITIONERS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. SECTION 664.6 AND GRANT ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS OF \$7,150.00; DECLARATION OF HANA S. KIM

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on all interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows:

Daniel M. Whitley 11 Deputy City Attorney 12 City Hall East 200 N. Spring Street, Room 920 13 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Telephone: (213) 978-7786 14 Facsimile: (213) 978-7811 Email: daniel.whitley@lacity.org 15 16

Michael G. Colantuono, Esq. Ryan Thomas Dunn, Esq. Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, PC 790 East Colorado Boulevard, Suite 850 Pasadena, CA 91101 Telephone: (213) 542-5700 Facsimile: (213) 542-5710 Email: mcolantuono@chwlaw.us Email: rdunn@chwlaw.us

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Attorneys for City of Los Angeles

Attorneys for Downtown Center BID

Management Corporation

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I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited in U.S. Postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. 1 am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

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Executed on January 24, 2018, at Los Angeles, California.

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